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This article first sets out the value of the political discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe. It 
argues that this work was central to the development of cultural studies, in its theorisation of 
social and cultural practices as being part of ‘political discourse’. This confers a dignity, status, 
value and political importance on cultural practices of all kinds. However, the article seeks 
to probe the limits of this approach to cultural politics, and it does so through a necessarily 
unusual exploration. First, it takes an example of something ostensibly trivial from the realms 
of film and popular culture and explores it in terms of Laclau and Mouffe’s categories, in two 
different ways. The ‘trivial’/pop cultural example is Bruce Lee. Could Bruce Lee be regarded 
as ‘politically’ significant or consequential? He was certainly an enormously influential film 
and popular cultural icon of the 1970s, one who arguably ignited a global ‘kung fu craze’. 
Moreover, Bruce Lee also had his own ‘hegemonic project’, seeking to transform and unify 
martial arts practices. In this paper, Bruce Lee’s own ‘project’ is first examined in the terms of 
Laclauian categories. These are shown to be extremely useful for grasping both the project and 
the reasons for its failure. Then the article moves into a wider consideration of the emergence 
of globally popular cultural discourses of martial arts. However, Laclau and Mouffe’s approach 
is shown to be somewhat less than satisfactory for perceiving at least some of the ‘political’ 
dimensions entailed in the spread martial arts culture and practices, from contexts of the global 
south into affluent contexts such as Hollywood film and Euro-American cultural practices. 
The paper argues that this is because Laclau and Mouffe’s approach is logocentric, which leads 
it to look for and to perceive a very limited range of factors: specifically, political identities 
formed through political demands. However, to more fully perceive the political dimensions 
of culture, the paper argues that different kinds of perspective, paradigms and analysis are 
required. Adopting or developing some of these would enrich the field of political studies.
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Special Issue: Reflections on post-Marxism: Laclau and Mouffe’s project of 
radical democracy in the 21st century
Introduction: from too theoretical to not theoretical enough
One value of Laclau and Mouffe’s political theory of hegemony and discourse is that 
it can so readily and productively be translated into and applied or deployed in studies 
of all kinds of things in all kinds of academic disciplines and fields. As theorised by 
Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony is a relational concept that enables us to conceptualise 
hierarchies, conventions, structures, values, norms, biases and preferences of all 
kinds, in terms of the interplay of relative gravities of different kinds of power and 
the formations and transformations of relations and kinds of influence (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985). Importantly, the concept of hegemony can be expanded, extracted or 
extrapolated from the realms of political discourse proper, and applied to show that 
there can often be said to be hegemonies in such things as aesthetics, styles, fashions, 
norms, practices, relationships, and in fact in conventions of any kind. There can 
be hegemony in international relations, in interpersonal relationships, in the most 
private ways of thinking, and of course in conventions and regimes of representation.
As such, Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and hegemony enables such ideas 
as the otherwise oxymoronic formulation ‘cultural politics’ to come into its own. 
Arguably, taken to its ultimate conclusions, Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse 
and hegemony could actually be said to transform a term like ‘cultural politics’ 
from being an oxymoron into being a pleonasm – transforming ‘culture’ and ‘politics’ 
from being regarded as ostensibly discrete and different to their being regarded as 
inextricably intertwined, two sides of the same coin, or tied like a Gordian Knot. 
Arditi and Valentine (1999) called this ‘the contingency of the commonplace’, a 
perspective which means that, from this point of view, anything and everything is 
at least potentially political.
Consequently, by theorising the contingency of all practices – whether ostensibly 
political, cultural, social, or whatever – the theory of hegemony and/as articulation 
(or of hegemony as established by articulatory practices) has long been found highly 
useful across a range of academic disciplines and fields of the arts, humanities and 
social sciences. In the prominent 1990s essay ‘Post-Marxism and Cultural Studies’, 
for instance, Angela McRobbie argued that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory actually 
provided a kind retroactive theoretical foundation – one that retrofitted and explicitly 
spelled out the ontological basis – of what had been going on for a while in a very 
wide range of more or less ‘politicised’ postmodernist and poststructuralist academic 
and intellectual efforts, such as cultural studies (McRobbie, 1992). In other words, 
although Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘post-Marxist discourse theory’ was born in the realms 
of political studies, it derived from and fed back into wider academic understandings 
of politics and the political across the university, and especially within the realms of 
what was increasingly referred to as (capital-t) Theory.
The term ‘Theory’ emerged to evoke a shifting cluster of literary theoretical, 
postmodernist, poststructuralist, psychoanalytic and related forms of cultural 
theorising, in which a number of prominent authors and texts managed to transcend 
or transgress erstwhile disciplinary boundaries and to find a very diverse readership 
(Hall, 2002; Birchall and Hall, 2006). This meant that works of Theory from one field 
or discipline – whether from literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, politics, history, 
or others – would often find a readership in some very different disciplinary contexts. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s ground-breaking work of political theory, Hegemony and socialist 
strategy: towards a radical democratic politics (1985) is perhaps an exemplary case of this.1
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This is not to say that Laclau and Mouffe’s work was universally accepted or that 
it did not draw criticism (Bowman, 2007). It received a lot of criticism, especially 
from other political theorists, and particularly from those who saw themselves as 
remaining true to Gramscian Marxism in ways that differed from Laclau and Mouffe’s 
radical poststructuralist rereading. Ironically, Hegemony and socialist strategy also received 
criticism from cultural studies’ own ‘father figure’, Stuart Hall, whose own (influential) 
understanding of cultural and political processes had earlier been significantly informed 
by Laclau’s first book, Politics and ideology in Marxist theory (Laclau, 1977). However, 
like many others, Hall regarded Laclau’s second book, Hegemony and socialist strategy 
(co-authored with Chantal Mouffe), to be a step too far – too far into ‘theory’ and 
too far away from paying close attention to the specificities and complexities of 
variable historical contexts and formations (Hall et al, 1996).
The terms of this and other criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe’s work are familiar. 
Such criticisms have often involved the claim that Laclau and Mouffe’s work is ‘too 
theoretical’. However, while my own exploration of their theoretical and analytical 
orientation is informed by such criticisms, I would like to make a different kind of 
critique here. This still derives from a politicised tradition of cultural studies, and 
relates to Stuart Hall’s criticism that Laclau and Mouffe’s seminal work moves too far 
away from the specificity of what Hall called conjunctural analysis, and relies too much 
on a kind of overarching theory of everything, so to speak. But my criticisms will 
also come from a different direction. In my critique, Laclau and Mouffe’s approach 
will not be presented as too theoretical. Instead, it will actually be presented as not 
theoretical enough.
A key early iteration of the critique I will develop can be found in a 1992 book by 
John Mowitt, in which he urges cultural studies scholars to hesitate before adopting 
what was then called the ‘post-Marxist discourse theory approach’ of Laclau and 
Mouffe (Mowitt, 1992). Mowitt advocated a critical hesitation before diving into 
the conceptual universe organised by terms like discourse, hegemony, articulation, 
antagonism, equivalence, difference, and so on, on the basis of the argument that 
there is a lot that this sort of paradigm is constitutively incapable of seeing.
The book in which Mowitt sets out this argument is Text: the genealogy of an 
antidisciplinary object (1992). One of the initial and initialising genealogical observations 
made within this work is that the term ‘discourse’, as theorised by Laclau and Mouffe, 
is demonstrably both historically and conceptually derived from and reductive of an 
older and more expansive notion: namely, ‘text’. Mowitt’s argument is that the 
elaboration of the notion of the text and the cluster of terms that emerged alongside 
it – such as textuality, intertextuality, deconstruction, and so on – was a significant 
intellectual (and immanently political) achievement. Moreover, it is an achievement 
that should be developed in all of its subtlety, complexity and sophistication, rather 
than formalised, standardised and reduced – which is what Mowitt claims the Laclau 
and Mouffe approach ended up doing.
Whether or not we agree with this, Mowitt’s genealogical study of the emergence 
of the notion of the text reveals that, before the development of ‘discourse theory’, 
the elaboration of the notion of the text was already a hugely significant paradigm 
shift in the arts, humanities and social sciences. Moreover, it was an advance that the 
subsequent theoretical formalisation of ‘discourse’ carried out by Laclau and Mouffe 
entirely relied upon. The problem, for Mowitt, is that it was a theoretical elaboration 
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that simplified and homogenised the historically and conceptually prior notion (or 
paradigm) of text and textuality.
This may not appear to be too much of a problem. Indeed, the metaphor of 
‘discourse’ seems to offer advances on ‘the text’ in many ways. For instance, discourse 
certainly seems to convey a sense of process, of movement, of temporal change and 
development, whereas the metaphor of ‘text’ might seem to imply a bounded object, 
in isolation and fixity. In fact, the common sense understanding of the relationship 
of text to discourse is that discourses are made up of texts. Nonetheless, taken to its 
extreme, the critique that Mowitt stages of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory 
involves the claim that their theoretical paradigm does not simply generate insights 
into the world, or produce a new kind of visibility. It also produces or enables specific 
kinds of blindness. This becomes a reason why (to borrow a phrase from Stuart Hall) 
cultural studies might want to ‘say yes and no at the same time’ to this kind of theory. 
Yes, the concept-metaphors of discourse theory are massively suggestive, generative 
and productive, enabling us to capture key dynamics and processes of the social, 
cultural and political world; but still, there are dangers and limits.
This can be expressed by using a pair of terms favoured by poststructuralist discourse 
theory: the onto and the ontic. The term ‘onto’ refers to ‘ontological’, while ‘ontic’ 
means ‘actually existing’. Using these terms, poststructuralist and postfoundationalist 
theory contends that ontology is ‘the political’, whereas actually existing institutions 
are the realm of politics, which is ‘ontic’ (Mouffe, 2005; Marchart, 2007). Normally 
these terms are deployed in discussions about ‘the world’. But if we focus them 
on post-Marxist discourse theory itself, then we might say that this kind of theory 
prefers an ‘onto-’ focus over an ‘ontic’ one. It prefers to talk about ‘big processes’ or 
‘fundamental ideas about reality’, rather than about particular details and matters 
of reality. In such discussions, the ‘onto’ focus (talking about ‘fundamental ideas 
about reality’) can easily come to appear to be a ‘macro’ focus (talking about ‘big 
processes’). Consequently, whether onto or macro, this kind of orientation might 
actually come to work to make our analyses blind to many of the realities of either 
‘micro’ or otherwise (merely) ‘ontic’ events, processes and situations of the world.
This criticism may strike some readers as very complicated or convoluted. This 
is because it is formulated in the kind of language and concepts preferred by many 
poststructuralist political theorists. However, in a way, it is just a restatement (in user-
unfriendly terms) of the kind of criticisms that Stuart Hall made about the direction 
that post-Marxist political theory appeared to be taking in the 1980s. To evoke and 
expand slightly on Hall’s words, the claim is that, in this kind of theory we hear a lot 
of talk of ‘positionalities’ but very little of actual positions, a lot about ‘contingent 
articulations’ but a lot less about what these actually are and what is contingent upon 
what, how that works in specific contexts, and so on. The claim is that such ‘political’ 
theorists tend either to deal with ‘macro-political’ issues, or to trade in ‘onto-political’ 
theory, rather than seriously attending to specific details, particular contexts, specific 
encounters, particular relations, specific institutions, particular media, and so on. In 
what follows I hope to show some of the ways in which this tendency may be (or 
become) limited and limiting, and to offer some suggestions for reorientation.
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Fighting literal discourse with particular texts
Specifically, the line of criticism that I would like to explore here boils down to 
the following assertion: that the approach of Laclau and Mouffe in 1985 (and all 
subsequent ‘Laclauian’ theory) is literalist and realist. In what follows, I will try to explain 
what I mean by this, and how it helps us to see the limits of the field of applicability 
of Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical understanding of cultural or discursive politics and 
the political. I will do so, first, by way of a reflection on the ‘discursive status’ of the 
emergence, proliferation and development of martial arts within multiple areas of 
global popular culture and in diverse discursive contexts. This reflection will begin 
by posing ‘Laclauian’ questions to and about both the texts and the ‘hegemonic 
project’ of Bruce Lee – a martial arts film star who was arguably both pioneer and 
pinnacle of the so-called ‘kung fu craze’ of the 1970s (Bowman, 2010b). From a 
political studies or discourse analysis perspective, the question to be posed would 
be whether the international kung fu craze of the 1970s and the subsequent growth 
and proliferation of martial arts in and as popular culture has any ‘political’ charge or 
political dimensions at all. Because of constraints of space, this will be a necessarily 
truncated account of only some key aspects of what we might call the popular cultural 
discourse of martial arts. But it will set the stage for my concluding discussion of 
an ostensibly simple Hollywood film. My ultimate conclusion will be that even 
supposedly ‘simple’ action films may have complicated cross-cultural consequences 
and even cultural-political force and value, in unexpected ways – ways that cannot be 
predicted or perhaps even perceived within an orthodox deployment of the theory 
(Chow, 1995; Bowman, 2013a).
The principal action film considered at the end will be The Bourne Identity (2002). 
The ultimate point of the journey from Bruce Lee through global mediatised martial 
arts discourse to this particular Hollywood film is to suggest some ways in which 
‘cultural/political’ discourse, or the political dimensions of popular culture, can be 
said to outrun or outpace the Laclau/Mouffe paradigm – a paradigm that in one 
sense may seem to capture all of this but in another sense remains completely blind 
or insensitive to it.
Before proceeding further, a note on the texts I will be using. What follows will 
principally deal with elements of what might be called the later Laclau. Accordingly, 
I will refer less frequently to ‘Laclau and Mouffe’ and more to ‘Laclau’, often using 
the adjective ‘Laclauian’. This is because, after co-authoring their 1985 Hegemony and 
socialist strategy, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s work went in slightly different directions. They 
would occasionally publish articles and chapters side by side in the same publications, 
as in Mouffe’s important 1996 edited collection Deconstruction and pragmatism (Mouffe, 
1996). But Mouffe went on to write more about different matters in politics with 
reference to a range of theorists, while Laclau concerned himself principally with 
developing his own theory of politics (or rather, the political). This work was arguably 
a direct development from the shared approach announced in 1985, but much was 
new. Consequently, what follows will often refer only to the name Laclau, or use the 
term ‘Laclauian’. This is because much of the relevant refinement of ‘their’ argument 
took place in Laclau’s subsequent single-authored publications.
For instance, it was only later on in his career that Laclau argued that antagonism 
produces an entity or identity in, through or as the production of a demand (Butler et 
al, 2000; Laclau, 2005). This (Lacanian) line of argumentation is certainly consistent 
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with the orientation of Hegemony and socialist strategy, but it is not until much later 
that Laclau decides to claim that the fundamental unit or focus of political analysis 
should be the demand. Similarly, it was only after 1985 that Laclau argued that cultural 
particularities contest and compete with each other for dominance, universalisation 
and/or hegemony. Such arguments can be projected back onto Hegemony and socialist 
strategy, but it is only post-1985 that Laclau states them in these terms.2
There are other such developments, but I single these out because it is with these 
that we will begin. For, I want to see what might happen when we use some of these 
Laclauian terms in the analysis of an example that is ‘outside’ of the field of politics 
‘proper’. As mentioned, the example is Bruce Lee, king of the global kung fu craze 
of the 1970s, enduring icon of martial arts culture internationally, and also easily 
categorised as ‘trivial’, ‘pop cultural’ and (accordingly) ‘not political’.
However, Lee was no mere image or empty vessel. Rather, he developed and 
disseminated some hugely influential arguments about his understanding of and 
hopes for the realms of martial arts. He had, in fact, a kind of hegemonic project.
Particular Lee Laclauian
Non-martial artists should be aware that the eternally returning question of martial 
arts is ‘which martial art is best?’ Whenever Bruce Lee was asked such a question, 
he would answer with words to this effect: as a species, humans only have two hands 
and two feet – so really, how many ways to fight can there be? The implication here 
is that there should be only one universal martial art. Lee preferred to say that he 
was against styles: styles ‘separate and divide us’, he would say. In Laclauian terms, 
Lee could be said to be against particularisms – whether local, regional, national, 
institutional, traditional, or disciplinary. He was for universalism. He was for rational 
‘scientific’ experimentation; for testing and verification; for working out what worked 
best. He was against ‘tradition without reason’, and rejected the idea of necessary or 
inevitable differences between cultures, styles or traditions in martial arts. To him, these 
signalled only limitation (Lee, 1971). He often made this argument in writing, and 
sometimes this argument made it onto the screen: Lee’s famous fight with Chuck 
Norris in Way of the Dragon and his unfinished film, Game of Death, for instance, are 
both structured as lessons about the importance of emancipation from cultural and 
disciplinary strictures and stultification (Bowman, 2010b, 2016).
In effect, Lee believed that martial arts plural should be universalised as martial art 
singular. Regional, ethnic or disciplinary styles should be overcome, and one set of 
(human) parameters and potencies should be uncovered. The proper route to this 
would be through research and experiment. This would necessarily be iconoclastic, 
colour-blind, transcultural, and universalist (Miller, 2000).3 However, in his apparent 
belief in the one, the ultimate, the universal, both history and theory reveal Lee’s theory 
to be idealistic: the inevitable failure of Lee’s theory, hope or prediction illustrates what 
Laclau would term the mutually constituting and reciprocally subverting relations 
between universalism and particularism (Laclau, 1992, 1996; Zerilli, 1998). Singularity 
is permanently deferred.
Given our current interest in the work of Laclau and Mouffe, I will explore this 
point and this relation. But, I want to be clear that this will be done in the spirit of 
exploration and enquiry rather than as an effort merely to prove one thing ‘right’ 
and another thing ‘wrong’. In other words, I am not merely going to use or abuse 
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Bruce Lee to ‘prove’ this or that point of political theory. Instead, I want to explore 
Bruce Lee and other issues in order to probe some of the limitations of this kind of 
political theory. Ultimately, however, I will suggest that this political theory – one 
that has been so influential in media, cultural studies, and other areas of the university, 
and from which we draw such suggestive terms and concepts as universalism, 
particularism, antagonism, articulation, hegemony, and so on – may nonetheless turn 
out to yield a rather limited conception of politics and the political, and indeed have 
a rather limited field of applicability in the study of the complexity of media, culture 
and society, and their relations, including those that have a political charge or are 
politically consequential. I hasten to add, however, that none of this will necessitate 
a rejection of Laclau and Mouffe, although it will suggest the need for ‘translation’ 
and reconstitution, in order to produce more (and quite possibly better) insights. To 
put this as provocatively as possible, my suggestion is that perhaps this political theory 
– and maybe even political theory per se – has only very limited applicability, even when used 
to analyse ‘cultural’ politics.
All of this might seem theoretical. But it matters, in two directions: first, insofar 
as any kind of politicised media or cultural studies needs concepts of politics and the 
political; and second, insofar as political studies surely also reciprocally need concepts 
or understandings of media and culture. Given the necessity of political theories 
and concepts, it may seem reasonable for media or cultural studies to import them 
directly from the field of political theory (Bowman, 2007). But, it deserves to be 
asked: can we actually trust the concepts of politics and the political that have been 
built in political theory? Do they actually work in (or for) media and cultural studies? 
Are they the best conceptualisations? Can they be universalised, or translated, or are 
they particular or singular to political theory?
To phrase this in terms of Mowitt’s suggestion that the ‘discourse paradigm’ might 
be regarded as a reduction of the earlier ‘textual paradigm’ from which it derives, we 
might ask: what might the Laclau/Mouffe discourse paradigm not be able to see? 
One polemical possibility might be that it cannot ‘see’ what we call culture; that it 
cannot ‘see’ the complexities of media; and that it cannot ‘see’ any of this because 
this theory – these sorts of theory, or the terms and concepts that organise them – is 
essentially logocentric.
Consequently, if this poststructuralist political theory turns out to be fundamentally 
logocentric (and maybe therefore also phonocentric, anthropocentric, realist and 
metaphysical), then it becomes important to establish what status its concepts have 
when our concerns lie with media and culture. Such fields are not necessarily 
dominated or driven by written or spoken words, or by intentionality, demands, 
assertions or collective wills, and they do not necessarily entail self-present entities 
and identities demanding things of each other. Yet, in Laclauian theory, media and 
culture are a key part of what Laclau calls the contingent and therefore political 
‘discursive terrain’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). As Laclau put it in 2000:
We gain very little, once identities are conceived as complexly articulated 
collective wills, by referring to them through simple designations such as 
classes, ethnic groups and so on, which are at best names for transient points 
of stabilisation. The really important task is to understand the logics of their 
constitution and dissolution, as well as the formal determinations of the 
spaces in which they interrelate. (Laclau, in Butler et al, 2000: 53)
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All of this suggests that media and culture are in a sense crucial for a Laclauian 
understanding of ‘politics’, even though Laclau himself never seriously undertook any 
analysis or anatomy of them. This is why I will highlight some differences between 
the ‘ways of looking’ (or paradigm) of political studies, on the one hand, and the 
paradigm of ‘politicised’ film, media or cultural studies, on the other. This exercise 
might be read either as signalling the extent to which disciplinary particularisms and 
limitations are inevitably involved in the building of any theory; or it might be read 
as the effort to establish a field, topos, or site of cross-disciplinary disagreement, which 
may constitute a contact zone that might creatively modify both fields.
So, to pose a provocative and hopefully productive question: what happens when 
we think about universalism and particularism not in terms of ‘political processes 
proper’ but by way of things that traverse the putatively distinct but entangled realms 
of media, culture, body, psyche, and which may even supplement politics – such as 
mediatised martial arts?
The pair ‘universalism and particularism’ in Laclau’s work come from Hegelian 
philosophy. They are a complex and important pair, with many dimensions and 
ramifications. I want to zone in on that, in Laclau’s work, they are what Jacques 
Derrida (1982, 1987) would call logocentric: they are words about words; and moreover, 
words that presume that what matters – whether exclusively or most – are arguments 
(about arguments) about ‘consensus’. For instance, in the mid-1990s, Laclau had this 
to say about the ‘dominant tendencies’ in approaches to questions of universalism 
and particularism:
We could say, with reference to the contemporary scene, that the dominant 
tendencies have been polarized around two positions. One of them 
unilaterally privileges universalism and sees in a dialogical process a way 
of reaching a consensus transcending all particularism (Habermas); the 
other, dedicated to the celebration of pure particularism and contextualism, 
proclaims the death of the universal (as in some forms of postmodernism). 
(Laclau, 1996: viii)
Here, Laclau’s formulation of the political problematic is dominated (or hegemonised) 
by the idea of ‘consensus’, and specifically of whether consensus is possible or 
impossible. It is to this extent that Laclau’s focus and his discourse is logocentric. 
As already suggested, perhaps this is necessarily the case with all political studies: 
political studies is a field so structured by words about words about actions that the 
discourse of politics is surely what Derridean deconstruction might regard as the most 
‘metaphysical’ of all discourses. What this means for us here is that we might start to 
wonder about the extent to which such a discourse can help us to think about – let 
alone to ‘understand’ – the complexities of mediatised cultural politics.
Universal Lee
To return to the universalism of Bruce Lee, let’s note that despite repeated and 
ongoing efforts to realise Bruce Lee’s universalist ambition the vision or dream of a 
kind of global levelling in martial arts practice has not yet come to pass. There have 
certainly been drives towards the eradication of particularisms in martial arts, as the 
emergence and growing hegemony of ‘mixed martial arts’ (MMA) today attests. But 
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one ‘universal’ martial art has never been found. However, this failure is not, as Bruce 
Lee believed, because martial artists are so blinkered, conformist and shackled to this 
or that particular tradition or stricture that they are unable to ‘break free’ from the 
fetters of ‘style’ and to ‘liberate [themselves] from classical [disciplines]’ (Lee, 1971). It 
is rather because, as Laclau argued, each and every universalism – each and every sense 
or theory or claim of universality – is constituted from some particularism or particularity: 
there is no escape from contingency; context is everything. Difference happens.
We can see the work of a (hegemonising) particularity that becomes placed in 
the position of a universal in Bruce Lee’s own particular ideas of what is universal. 
Lee’s ideas about the essential, the necessary and the best were based on a belief 
in the superiority of directness and straight lines in attack. This belief comes from 
his formative training in wing chun kung fu, a style that privileges straight lines and 
directness. Subsequently, Lee sought out direct linear techniques wherever he could 
– most famously championing Western boxing’s ‘straight lead’ and European fencing 
stances (Tom, 2005).
However, as every martial artist knows, once your opponent knows how you fight, 
then your techniques, moves, strategies and tactics can be comprehended, anticipated 
and combatted by counter-moves, strategies and tactics. There are no objectively 
superior techniques. Indeed, if there is any ‘essence’ to fighting, it is not (as Lee once 
argued) that it is ‘simple and direct’; it is rather that fighting is a bit like the game 
‘rock, paper, scissors’, or the Chinese idea of the ‘five elements’: A might beat B, 
but C can beat A, and B can beat C, and so on and so on – in a potentially endlessly 
moving, morphing, modifying and modulating process. As mentioned, Lee’s belief 
in the superiority of simple directness was arguably little more than a reflection of 
the extent to which his own thinking about combat had been hegemonised at an 
early stage by the theory underpinning a particular style – the art of wing chun kung fu.
This particularism would remain actively dominant in Lee’s theory and practice, 
even though later on he would come to say that he had abandoned Chinese kung fu 
as such – precisely because he wanted to transcend particularism. Indeed it is clear that 
his own approach (that he named jeet kune do) is indebted much more to the principles 
of European fencing and the approach to punching advocated by boxers such as the 
Welsh Jim Driscoll than to anything specifically or necessarily Chinese (which is 
not to say that these same principles are not present in specific Chinese martial arts; 
Tom, 2005). The point to be emphasised is that Lee’s avowed abandonment of his 
formative wing chun kung fu approach still retained quite a residue – or strong traces 
– of the preference for certain of wing chun principles and preferences (Inosanto, 
1994). In other words, despite Lee’s convictions about universality, we can see that 
his thoughts and practices were hegemonised throughout by one very precise sort of 
contingent particularity.
Media ties
Hopefully this quick analysis of one of Bruce Lee’s positions on an abiding concern 
for all martial artists shows how unexpectedly useful and relevant Laclauian political 
theory ideas can be, even when wrenched from their ‘proper’ political theory context 
and applied in unusual ‘cultural studies’ cases. However, we have not yet discursively 
situated Bruce Lee or clarified why any of this might matter to anyone anywhere. 
And certainly, an elementary question for any discourse analysis might be: why 
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single out Lee as important? A subsequent question for us will then be: how might 
any such example (in this case, of mediatised martial arts discourse) supplement our 
understanding of politics?
To take the first question first. Many commentators have argued that Bruce Lee 
was immediately a pole of what Bill Brown (1997) calls ‘cross-ethnic identification’. 
Moreover, both T.M. Kato (2007) and Vijay Prashad (2001) argue that Lee functioned 
as a key player in decolonisation struggles – specifically what Kato (following 
Jameson) calls the struggles to decolonise postcolonial consciousness. Lee’s amazing 
choreographies redirected transnational multi-ethnic desires towards an Asian set of 
activities (‘Oriental’ martial arts), and he was the first major male alternative to the 
ubiquitous white Western movie hero (Bowman, 2010a, 2010b, 2013b).
We could go on – situating Bruce Lee as important and influential in context after 
context, in different ways and for different reasons with different effects. However, 
doing so achieves more than demonstrating his macro-discursive status or importance. 
Rather, as even this fleeting overview of some interpretations of Bruce Lee suggests: 
any textual or discourse analyses of Bruce Lee are inevitably going to take us far 
afield, and lead us in different directions. For there was much more going on in, 
through and around Bruce Lee and the emergence of an international multicultural 
popular cultural discourse of martial arts in the 1970s. (I have filled two books with 
discussions of this ‘much more’, and I still feel that I have barely scratched the surface.)
One thing that it is pertinent to mention in this context is the place that the 
cinematic texts of Bruce Lee (along with other Hong Kong martial arts films), via 
their global distribution, played in cross-ethnic and postcolonial cultural processes. 
What Bill Brown calls Lee’s ‘generic ethnicity’ and the emotive ‘ethnic-underdog-
versus-the-oppressor’ plots of his Hong Kong films offered was a kind of imminently 
politicising (albeit fundamentally fantasy) vision of agency. For these reasons alone, 
Bruce Lee could be written into many more kinds of postcolonial media or popular 
cultural histories than he has been.
In more obviously ‘discourse theory’ or ‘discourse analysis’ terms, Lee ‘himself ’ 
must be situated in the flows between a hypercapitalist Hollywood and a colonial 
Hong Kong. But this does not necessarily make the ‘effects’ of Lee’s texts either 
simply capitalist or simply to do with Hong Kong or British colonialism. In fact, 
the effects of his texts seem to have been ‘felt’ most powerfully in postcolonial and 
ghettoised/racialised contexts, although they were certainly not limited to them. And 
an interesting thing, widely noted by commentators, is that what was seen in these 
celluloid spectacles was widely received as being somehow political in ways that were not 
necessarily perceived in other ostensibly ‘similar’ martial arts films (Bowman, 2013b).
In a literal sense, in Bruce Lee’s and other martial arts films of the 1970s, virtually 
all viewers, the world over, were seeing what they believed to be ancient martial arts, 
from China and Japan.4 Of course, these were only ever, at most, ‘invented traditions’ 
(Anderson, 1991; Said, 2005), or even Baudrillardian simulacra (Baudrillard, 1994). 
Indeed, the very object or field called ‘martial arts’ was effectively invented in popular 
cultural discourses through these cinematic ‘(re)presentations’ or simulacra. Accordingly, 
this mediatised discourse arrived fully-formed, as if it were ancient and timeless. 
Moreover, it had our opening question already inscribed within it: which style is best? 
This question was there from the start, and it remains the animating problematic of 
discourses about martial arts (even if the answer given by Bruce Lee films was always 
the same: what is best is what Bruce Lee does).
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Since the 1970s, at least, such mediatisation has always both fuelled and impeded – or 
skewed – the evolution or development of martial arts (like the Lacanian object-cause 
of desire). The drive to answer the question ‘which style is best?’ via the institution 
of ostensibly no-holds-barred MMA competitions such as the Ultimate Fighting 
Championship (UFC) first deconstructed and even seemed to jeopardise the very 
idea of particular styles surviving. But over time ‘mixed martial arts’ inevitably became 
just one institution or approach among others. Moreover, as brutal and efficient as 
MMA is, people now know that it is fundamentally a sport. And sport – surely – is 
a very different thing to the martial. Accordingly, those looking for ‘the ultimate’ 
martial art continue to look. And one place they look is to the unequivocally martial 
practices of the military.
Natural Bourne identities
The most well-known military martial arts styles currently available in some form 
to civilians include the US Marine Corps Martial Arts Programme (MCMAP), the 
Russian military style called sistema, the Israeli martial art, krav maga, and Filipino 
martial arts, variously called arnis, kali or escrima. There are others. However, none 
of these martial arts are anywhere near as well known as the arts disseminated 
cinematically in the 1970s, such as ‘kung fu’, ‘karate’ and ‘taekwondo’. This difference 
likely arises because military styles are often ugly, bloody, brutal, necessarily painful 
and unpleasant to practice, plus they have no immediate sporting interpretation or 
application. So they cannot easily be branded as either pleasant or uplifting. Indeed, 
to extend arguments made by both Bill Brown and Slavoj Žižek at different times: 
these arts cannot easily be existentialised or ideologically recuperated as ‘spiritually 
uplifting’ or as ‘paradoxically peaceful’ (Reid and Croucher, 1984) or ‘self-improving’ 
practices (Brown, 1997; Bowman, 2010b, 2013a). Nevertheless, one such military 
martial art was selected to be the style of fighting used by a Hollywood action hero in 
a film that immediately transformed mainstream movie fight choreography by setting 
a new standard. This was the Filipino art of kali or escrima. It was chosen as the style 
of fighting used by Jason Bourne in the Bourne Identity series of films.5
What happens when we expose this to the questions of universalism and 
particularism? In Laclau, the universal is an empty place that is variously hegemonised 
by words, claims, or, in Laclau, demands (Laclau, 2005). These words, claims, demands 
and assertions are always traceable back to complexly articulated political wills. So 
a demand can always be tied to a particular entity, an entity that Laclau regards as 
having come into existence with and through and in the formation of the demand. 
The aim of the group/demand is to universalise or hegemonise the demand until it 
is satisfied and they/it can recede into the slumber of realisation/satisfaction. ‘They’ 
will only persist as an entity to the extent that they are implicit (because hegemonic), 
or should they need to wake from the slumber of their satisfaction in order to defend 
their achievements.
So far, so logocentric. However, what I hope to be able to suggest in the light of 
the cases of the mediatisation of martial arts that I have mentioned is the way that 
what we might call mediatised universals (in our case, the performance of the superiority 
of various particular martial arts at particular times via complexly articulated 
technological platforms, relations and contexts) do not necessarily arise as the result 
of some simple claim. Claims can be and are made. But the visual spectacle (and 
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the textual complex) is not reducible to the logic of consensus or dissensus that 
hegemonises political theory (Laclau, 1992, 1996).
Moreover, in relation to the political theory claim that universals are produced 
through the political constitution of the group, let us recall that all of the major popular 
fashions in martial arts of the world have a complex and shifting relation not only to 
media but also to colonialism, postcoloniality and/or decolonial projects. However, 
they cannot be simply attached to any one identity or any one claim.
The kung fu craze of the 1970s emerged from what Rey Chow has taught us to 
regard as the highly complex location of colonial Hong Kong (Chow, 1998) and it 
flared up first (and most) in a range of particularly politically and socioeconomically 
complex urban centres and ghettoes, the world over. The first US martial arts 
actors were trained in the Japanese and Korean arts that they had learned as a direct 
consequence of American military action and occupation in these areas (it was 
Japanese and Korean arts that were first imported to America en masse, by returning 
servicemen; Krug, 2001). Karate-do itself had already been reconstructed as Japanese 
by its ‘founder’, Funakoshi Gichin, who actually took the art from Okinawa to Japan 
in the early 20th century. In Okinawa, it had long been called not ‘karate-do’ (which 
was Funakoshi’s Japanification of the name, meaning as it does empty-hand-way), but 
‘China hand’ – a name that registers the multiply-colonised status of the Ryukyu 
Islands themselves (Funakoshi, 1975).
There are many other examples of complex processes and relations between martial 
arts and the moves from colony to post colony to nation. In Brazil, for instance, there 
is the case of capoeira – which was first an art of African slaves and then a martial art of 
the Brazilian underclass. All kinds of authorities have, by turns, tried to outlaw it, to 
sportify it, to gentrify it, to standardise it and otherwise to domesticate or nationalise 
it (Assunção, 2005; Downey, 2005). There have been similar cases in Shanghai with 
Jing Wu, in China generally with wushu, in Indonesia with pencak silat, in Europe 
with fencing, and so on (Eichberg, 1983; Wilson, 2009).
The point to be made here is that each of these arts clearly in some sense 
hegemonised various cultural, countercultural and mainstream scenes, but no audible 
claim has been made arising in formation with them. This is doubtless why critics 
like Žižek and a number of people (such as those discussed by Bill Brown) regard the 
constitution of identities via martial arts films to be symptomatic of failed class longing 
(Brown, 1997). But, I would add: when we are dealing with the forces or flows of 
media and culture, the matter of collective or political identity constantly moves and 
recedes, and never seems to be fully or properly present, like the parallax of a rainbow.
Of course, there is always the rejoinder: media and culture are not politics. Yet, 
to reiterate, they must have some relation to politics. As Laclau himself argues: the 
universal is an empty place, variously filled with hegemonic contents and contestations 
in the discursive terrain. Media and culture are the Laclauian discursive terrain.
So what, then, might we make of the curious simultaneous centring and erasing 
of Filipino martial arts in The Bourne Identity films? I say centring and erasing because 
at no point in the films is the Filipino character of Jason Bourne’s fighting style ever 
indicated. Quite the contrary, in fact: Jason Bourne is the ultimate secret product of 
the US government. His fighting style is presented as a pinnacle only attained by the 
most elite soldier of the US military. In other words, here a Filipino particularism is 
passed off as American dominance.
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In Laclauian terms, the universal is always a particularism that has become 
hegemonic. But here, US universalism is represented by a Filipino particularism 
(‘under erasure’ or ‘sous rature’, as poststructuralists used to say). This is something 
that Laclauian theory seems ill-equipped to deal with; at least, not until its residual 
realist, literalist phonocentrism – its inheritance from political theory ‘proper’ – has 
been somewhat displaced, or indeed decolonised. For, to stay with our example: this 
hegemonic particularism does not literally or ‘really’ relate to or reflect the achievement 
of any kind of Filipino demand or reflect any kind of Filipino political entity. Indeed, 
if we were to regard culture as property, then it would be easy to conclude that a 
nasty white Hollywood has once again expropriated the cultural heritage of one of 
its own former colonies. This would be one kind of anti-colonialist mode of reading. 
However, it would be premised on a problematic belief in culture as involving 
property and ownership rights. This is a common belief, but it is one that plays into 
the hands of ethnonationalist essentialism (do you really have to be Filipino to ‘do’ 
Filipino martial arts?).
Of course, I do not want to disparage claims of lineage or the importance of heritage. 
Far from it. I am aware that the Filipino martial arts are in a complex and ongoing 
dialogue with processes of decolonising, nation-building, community-building, 
culture construction, heritage preservation, economic stimulation, and so on, in 
much the same way as are many other martial arts and sports the world over. I am 
equally aware that many Filipino martial arts masters have died in poverty and that 
unknown numbers of family schools and styles and lineages have vanished without 
trace (Wiley, 1996). And it is for these reasons and more that I also feel uneasy when 
I see clips on YouTube of martial arts classes in shiny clubs in the US or Europe in 
which students are dressed up in traditional Filipino outfits to practise the art.
But, at the same time, I have also heard Filipino masters state (again, on YouTube) 
that the situation is simply this: as soon as Westerners get into something, they 
dominate it, they master it – and not in a bad way: they dominate it through love, 
time, effort and commitment. The vast majority of people in the Philippines do not 
have the money or time to devote to these arts. Comparatively affluent Westerners 
do. Which is why the martial arts themselves travel, become diasporic, and are much 
more mobile than the people of the places from whence they come. They can even 
be, so to speak, paradoxically disembodied bodily diasporas – physical practices moving 
from body to body without physical contact.
Reciprocally, in response to the mainstreaming of Filipino martial arts in Hollywood 
choreography, new drives have been initiated both in the Philippines and in diasporic 
Filipino communities to embrace and showcase their martial arts. Documentaries are 
being produced, traditions are being constructed, reconstructed, (re)invented, fleshed 
out, fabulated. The postcolonial Philippines and Filipinos are not simply victims. No 
one has been ‘duped’ (Chow, 1993). In fact, the translation between cultures that 
is occurring here, in and through and around – because of – the image, constitutes 
the bringing into visibility of that which may otherwise have remained occluded.
Of course, the main text of the Bourne series makes absolutely no reference to the 
Filipino dimensions of Jason Bourne’s fighting style. But one need not be Sherlock 
Holmes to find out about the choreographic style. A quick Google search will suffice. 
And as the many ‘making of ’ clips on YouTube and the ‘how to fight like Jason 
Bourne’ websites that sprang up in the wake of the film’s success all let us know: it 
is Filipino Kali.6
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So what can we see here – or not – in this simple action film? What is happening 
in it, through it, or because of it? I would suggest: we can see some ways in which 
non-literal, non-direct, and constitutively mediated transactions between cultures 
can both take place and not take place. Western appropriation, here, may not be so 
unequivocally despicable. The ‘fake’ image, the simulation, can also be a source of 
cultural encounter. Cultural dialogues can be non-logocentric. The forging of cultural 
relations can be both between or across cultures, and between a culture and itself, and on 
both sides of the spectacle. The film can be read simultaneously as yet another moment 
of the ‘internal’ relationship Hollywood has with itself, and with other cultures, and as 
a moment of the ‘internal’ relationship that a postcolonial culture can come to have 
with itself, its others and its own otherness through the processes of mediatisation. It 
is a cultural translation. And in the words of Rey Chow: ‘If translation is a form of 
betrayal, then the translators pay their debt by bringing fame to the ethnic culture’ 
(Chow, 1995: 202).
Filipino martial arts have achieved increased fame recently, thanks to DVD and 
post-DVD technologies and conventions, involving the production and dissemination 
of ‘extras’ like ‘making of ’ mini-documentaries and interviews with directors, 
stunt performers and fight choreographies (Hunt, 2014). With these technological 
developments, the long-unacknowledged centrality of Filipino martial arts in 
Hollywood fight choreography has received some redress, and a whole host of 
economic, cultural and even political consequences have flowed from this. Filipino 
martial arts have gained prestige and importance both in the Philippines and 
internationally, in multiple ways with multiple consequences.
And this is just one ‘little’ case. An ‘orthodox’ political discourse analysis might 
have been inclined to write it all off as trivial at the outset. However, it is my 
hope that a new generation of readers of both media/culture and politics/political 
theory will continue to employ the contributions of the late (great) Ernesto Laclau 
in analyses of objects, practices, phenomena, institutions and encounters from all 
areas of, across, between and among cultures, without limiting the use of Laclau’s 
texts to ‘politics proper’ and without forcing cultural analyses to operate in terms 
of ultimately simplifying universalisms at the expense of complex particularities. To 
make the best use of Laclau’s (and Mouffe’s) theoretical advances, my suggestion is that 
the logocentrism that silently hegemonises or universalises this corpus be noted and 
interrogated with a view to its productive displacement and eventual decolonisation.
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Notes
1  Nonetheless, as Jennifer Slack (1996) has argued, Laclau and Mouffe’s contribution 
to the development of cultural studies and cultural/political theory has often been 
unjustly ‘written out’ of many of the ‘official’ histories of cultural studies.
2  My choice of these two examples of arguments is motivated or tendentious. I single 
them out here because the relations between demand and political identity and 
particularity and hegemony are not only at the core of Laclauian political theory but 
also pertinent to my critique. For both of these arguments imply some problematic 
assumptions. One is the assumed relation between politics and identity. For instance, 
one often sees in Laclau the assumption that a group has its own proper identity. This 
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may not be permanent or total, but Laclauian theory makes a claim that political 
identities are constituted through the antagonism and the demand. Postcolonialist 
scholars or theorists may worry that therefore this paradigm remains deaf and blind to 
all but the noisiest and most present of entities and identities. What of the subaltern? 
What of the silent or silenced? The unseen? The unheard? The postcolonial media 
theorist might want to ask: what if the element expropriated from the silent or the 
silenced is actually showcased and moved centre stage? What if that which becomes 
universalised or hegemonic in the mainstream of the mainstream – in other words, 
hegemonic in the hegemony – is something from the subaltern place, context, people, 
community? As will become clear, I am thinking specifically of the incorporation of 
Filipino martial arts into the choreography of The Bourne Identity trilogy – which is 
discussed at the end of this article.
3  Not unlike science. However, Lee did not use the term martial science. He retained 
the term martial art – because, for him, every individual practitioner should find their 
own way to ‘honestly express’ themselves. His belief in the inevitability of individual 
difference (but not cultural difference) is why, for Lee, hand-to-hand combat remained 
art and not science. There is no ‘one size fits all’ formula; there is only feel and flow 
and degrees of effectiveness, and no simple objectivity: what works is what you can 
make work. As he once reputedly put it, ‘the fastest punch is the one that lands first’. 
So, Lee’s universalist humanism allowed for singularity (individual uniqueness) but not 
particularity (local, regional or institutional cultural uniqueness).
4  Of course, no matter how ‘old’ or ‘young’ these arts may ‘really’ have been, the martial 
traditions, first of China and then of Japan were thoroughly mediatised – by Hollywood, 
Hong Kong, Japanese and other regional film industries – throughout the 1970s. But 
the term ‘real’ is problematic here: for, with Lee, we were not really seeing ancient 
Chinese arts, but rather his own hybrid style; just as with the Japanese enemies in his 
films, we were not really seeing real Japanese arts, but rather those arts as imagined in 
Hong Kong.
5  The series itself involved more than one director, and a very varied crew; but along 
with the main character, Jason Bourne (played by Matt Damon), one other crucial 
thing at least that remained constant in the production of the films was the films’ 
fight choreography, and the films’ fight choreographer, Jeff Imada. This is particularly 
pertinent because, arguably, it was in large part the fight choreography (along with 
the cinematography) that ‘made’ these films – that made them stand out, that defined 
them, that made them unique and memorable. The fight choreography certainly caused 
ripples that reached the very heart of mainstream movie production discourse, to the 
extent that even action staples like the eternally returning James Bond movies reacted 
by changing their cinematographic and action-choreographic styles in response to the 
paradigm shift effected by the Bourne choreography.
6  The fight choreographer, Jeff Imada tells us: Bourne does kali combined with some 
military stuff and – in his words – ‘some Bruce Lee stuff ’. Is this the casual, blasé 
nonchalance of an arrogant westerner who simply regards all this ‘stuff ’ as ‘stuff ’, and 
conflates it indiscriminately? Maybe. But Jeff Imada is himself the protégé of Dan 
Inosanto. Dan Inosanto is both ethnically Filipino and a close friend and senior student 
of Bruce Lee. Indeed, Inosanto is one of the very few people authorised directly by 
Bruce Lee to teach his martial art. After Bruce Lee’s death in 1973, Inosanto continued 
to teach both Bruce Lee’s jeet kune do and the Filipino martial arts, before going on 
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to work in fight choreography. Jeff Imada, a contemporary and friend of Bruce Lee’s 
son, Brandon, followed Inosanto into this work.
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